CFO Gender and Bad News Disclosure by XEDEJAMES
 学校编码：10384   
学号：27820141154478   
 
硕  士  学  位  论  文 
CFO 性别和坏消息披露 
CFO Gender and Bad News Disclosure   
Xede James  
指 导 教 师 姓 名 ： Jinshuai  Hu  
专 业 名 称 ： 会            计                 学 
论 文 提 交 日 期 ： 2 0 1 6 年  月 
论 文 答 辩 日 期 ： 2 0 1 6 年  月 
学 位 授 予 日 期 ： 2 0 1 6 年  月 
        
  答辩委员会主席：         
   评         阅      人： 
                   
              2016 年           月 
分类号_______密级 ______ 
UDC       
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
  
厦门大学学位论文原创性声明 
 
本人呈交的学位论文是本人在导师指导下,独立完成的研究成果。本人在论文写作中
参考其他个人或集体已经发表的研究成果，均在文中以适当方式明确标明，并符合法律规
范和《厦门大学研究生学术活动规范（试行）》。 
另外，该学位论文为（                            ）课题（组）的研究成果，获得（               ）
课题（组）经费或实验室的资助，在（               ）实验室完成。（请在以上括号内填写课
题或课题组负责人或实验室名称，未有此项声明内容的，可以不作特别声明。）  
 
 
 
                                  声明人（签名） 
                                      年            月           日
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
  
厦门大学学位论文著作权使用声明 
 
本人同意厦门大学根据《中华人民共和国学位条例暂行实施办法》等规定保留和使用
此学位论文，并向主管部门或其指定机构送交学位论文（包括纸质版和电子版），允许学
位论文进入厦门大学图书馆及其数据库被查阅、借阅。本人同意厦门大学将学位论文加入
全国博士、硕士学位论文共建单位数据库进行检索，将学位论文的标题和摘要汇编出版，
采用影印、缩印或者其它方式合理复制学位论文。 
本学位论文属于： 
（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，于   年  月  日解密，
解密后适用上述授权。 
（√    ）2.不保密，适用上述授权。 
（请在以上相应括号内打“√”或填上相应内容。保密学位论文应是已经厦门大学保密
委员会审定过的学位论文，未经厦门大学保密委员会审定的学位论文均为公开学位论文。
此声明栏不填写的，默认为公开学位论文，均适用上述授权。） 
 
                                                                                     声明人（签名)   
                          年           月          日 
  
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
  
CONTENTS 
摘要 ............................................................................................................................ i 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. ii 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT .................... 5 
2.1 Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 5 
2.1.1 The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) ................................................................................ 5 
2.1.2 Gender Based Literature and Information Disclosure .................................................... 6 
2.1.3 CFOs and Information Disclosure .................................................................................. 8 
2.1.4 CFOs and Accounting Improprieties .............................................................................. 8 
2.1.5 Dividend Change and Information Relevance ................................................................ 9 
2.1.6 Factors Influencing Firms‟ Dividend Policy ................................................................ 10 
2.2 Hypothesis Development .................................................................................................... 13 
2.2.1 Female CFOs Influence over Firms‟ Issuance of Timely and High Quality Financial 
Statements. ............................................................................................................................. 13 
2.2.2 Propensity of Firms with Female CFOs Issuing Timely Warnings or Bad News ........ 14 
3. METHODOLOGY...............................................................................................16 
3.1 Sample Selection ................................................................................................................. 16 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................................................... 16 
3.3 Research Design .................................................................................................................. 20 
4. RESULTS ............................................................................................................23 
4.3 Additional Analysis ............................................................................................................. 27 
4.4 Robustness ........................................................................................................................... 30 
5. CONCLUSION, SUGGESTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ..................................32 
5.1 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 32 
5.2 Suggestions.......................................................................................................................... 33 
5.3 Limitations .......................................................................................................................... 33 
REFERENCES .........................................................................................................34 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .......................................................................................40 
DEDICATION .........................................................................................................41 
 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
 i 
 
摘要 
 
本文中，我考察了 CFO 性别与公司早期披露的负面消息及低水平经营绩效之间的关系。尤
其考察了有女性 CFO的公司是否明显有负面消息披露至证券市场。在基于性别研究的文献
的基础上，此文对两个主要假设展开讨论：（1） 有女性 CFO位于管理高层的公司更能够
及时地发布高质量的、准确的财务报告；（2）有女性 CFO 的公司相比于没有女性 CFO 的
公司更倾向于向股票市场披露负面消息或警告。基于样本的实证研究验证了这些假设。样
本中涵盖了从 2002 年到 2014 年对 4780 家公司的年度考察(其中 4341 家公司没有女性
CFO，439 家公司有女性 CFO)。结果表明，女性 CFO 对于公司发布的财务报告质量有显著
影响。女性 CFO对公司早期的财务披露也有显著影响，并且这种影响在记录坏消息（股利
减少）多于好消息（股利增加）的那些公司更为明显。综合考虑，结果表明，女性 CFO对
于公司的信息披露产生积极影响。 
关键词： CFO，性别，坏消息，披露 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, I examine the relationship between CFO gender and early disclosure of bad 
news or bad business performance, particularly whether firms with a female CFO have 
distinctive disclosure of bad news to the equity market. Based on the findings of gender based 
literature, the paper proceeds on two main assumptions: (1) firms with female CFOs in their top 
managerial positions are better positioned to issue timely and high quality financial statements, 
and (2) firms with female CFOs are more likely to issue timely warnings (bad news) to the stock 
market than firms with no female CFOs. The empirical results, based on a sample that covers 
2002 – 2014, with a total of 4780 firm year observations (4341 for firms without female CFOs 
and 439 for firms with female CFOs) are consistent with these conjectures. The results show that 
female CFOs have significant impacts on the quality of financial statements issued by firms and 
that female CFOs have significant influence over firms early financial disclosure and it is more 
pronounced when firms record bad news (dividend decrease) than good news (dividend increase). 
Taking together, the results show that female CFOs have good impacts on firms‟ early 
information disclosure.    
 
 
Key Words: CFO, Gender, Bad news, Disclosure 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines how the CFO
1
 gender influences early disclosure of bad news or bad 
business performance through the financial statements, particularly whether firms with a female 
CFO have distinctive disclosure of bad news to the equity market. Following Kothari, Shu, and 
Wysocki (2009), I infer the timeliness of early disclosure of bad news and good news based on 
the magnitude of the stock market reaction to this news.  
Many companies‟ information disclosures are determined by top executives including 
CFOs. Unlike corporate characteristics, corporate governance, managers financial expertise, 
culture and religious believes, comparatively, there is little empirical evidence (if not none) on 
whether the gender of top executives like the CFO impacts the financial statements and the 
timeliness of bad news or bad business performance disclosure. 
Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the role of the CFO with 
respect to financial reporting and disclosure has been the subject matter of many academic 
research papers, e. g. Geiger and North (2006),
2
 Barua, Davidson, Rama, and Thiruvadi (2010), 
Jiang, Petroni, and Yanyan Wang (2010), Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin (2011), Ge, Matsumoto, 
and Zhang (2011). The section 302 of the Act enjoins the CEO and CFO to ensure the accuracy, 
documentation, and submission of corporate annual financial reports together with internal 
control mechanisms to the Security and Exchange Commission. Focusing on the CFO; he/she 
has virtually full control over the financial reporting activities of the firm and thus he/she is more 
likely to have significant influence over what, how and when to report a financial decision (see 
Mian (2001),
3
 Geiger and North (2006)). Recent papers suggest that firms with CFOs have less 
discretionary accruals (Geiger & North, 2006), and have significant earnings management 
(Krishnan & Dowdell, 2004).  
                                                          
1
 CFO in this paper refers to the Chief Financial Officer. 
 
2
 Geiger and North (2006) find that “individuals in CFO positions wield significant influence over 
the firm's reported financial results and that a firm's discretionary accruals are significantly reduced 
surrounding the appointment of a new CFO.” 
3
 Mian (2001) documents that CFO are ultimately responsible for the development and 
implantation of organisational policies that regulate the financial discipline of the firm.     
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Evidence from disclosure based literature shows that voluntary information disclosure 
provides significant benefits for shareholders. For example, voluntary information disclosure can 
raise shareholders expectations of good performance as well reduce cost of capital (Kwak, Ro, & 
Suk, 2012). These benefits serve as a source of motivation for managers to disclose voluntary 
information to shareholders (bad or good news) (Kwak et al., 2012). However, while managers 
have strong motivation to voluntarily disclose information, they face opposing challenges like  
litigation risk, loss of job etc. disclosing bad news (Kothari et al., 2009). Since the CFO has 
significant role to play with regard to what, how and when to disclose a financial decision, it is 
not empirically clear from the existing literature how the gender of the CFO influences decisions 
regarding the quality of the financial statements and the disclosure of bad news to the investors. 
The existing literature investigates issues like CFO gender and voluntary disclosure in the 
financial reports (Nalikka, 2009). Nalikka (2009) investigates this relationship using companies 
listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, Finland during the 2008 financial year. Others focus on 
firm characteristics, corporate governance issues, directors financial expertise and experiences 
and culture as they have significant impacts on firms information disclosure (Chau and Gray 
(2002), Archambault and Archambault (2003), Akhtaruddin (2005), Matsunaga and Yeung 
(2008)). For example, Archambault and Archambault (2003) find that systems like culture, 
national system and corporate characteristics have significant impacts on the disclosure level of 
firms.  
Thus, in this paper, I investigate the relationship between CFO gender and financial 
statements quality and firms early disclosure of bad news to the stock market. Particularly, this 
paper investigates whether firms with female CFOs
4
 in their top managerial positions have 
distinctive disclosure of bad business performance or bad news. The main motivation is that as 
per my knowledge, there has been no specific empirical evidence that shows how the CFO 
gender influences early disclosure of bad news (or warning) to investors.  
                                                          
4
 The focus of this paper is on the female CFO because both males and females behave differently 
in different settings and circumstances. For example, in the psychological literature, fields such as finance, 
males are known to be more overconfident than females, and thus, males are more likely to trade more 
than females. Consistent with this argument, Barber and Odean (2001) find that males trade 45% more 
than females and that the overtrading reduces males‟ net worth by 2.65% as against 1.72% for females per 
annum.  
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  Various factors provide incentives for females to influence decisions and behaviour of 
organisations they work with. Gender based literature posits that in general, females are risk 
averse. Barua et al. (2010) find that female managers are synonymous with less earnings 
management. Larkin, Bernardi, and Bosco (2013) find that higher number of female presence on 
boards is linked to higher sense of responsible corporate behaviour and reduce the level of 
“group think”. Others find that women are relatively conservative in financial reporting (Francis, 
Hasan, Park, & Wu, 2014), and female analysts are bolder and accurate in issuing earnings 
forecasts (Kumar, 2010).    
Based on the findings of gender based literature, the paper proceeds on two main 
assumptions: (1) firms with female CFOs in their top managerial positions are better positioned 
to issue timely and high quality financial statements, and (2) firms with female CFOs are more 
likely to issue timely warnings (bad news) to the stock market than firms with no female CFOs. 
Consistent with these conjectures, I find evidence that female CFOs have significant impacts on 
the quality of financial statements issued by firms. I also find that female CFOs have significant 
influence over firms early financial disclosure and it is more pronounced when the firms record 
bad news (dividend decrease) than good news (dividend increase) as the amount of total 
information included in the financial statements is more for bad news than good news.  
This paper extends and complements the literature on voluntary information disclosure
5
 
by specifically investigating the relationship between CFO gender and bad news disclosure to the 
equity market. Unlike my paper, it is not empirically clear from the existing literature how the 
gender of the CFO influences firms‟ early disclosure of bad news to investors.6  
My paper is close to Kothari et al. (2009) but differs on the ground that while Kothari et 
al. (2009) treat managers as a homogeneous unit, my paper focuses on the gender of CFOs to 
ascertain firms timely disclosure of bad news. Since both males and females behave differently 
in different settings and circumstances, it is worthy examining how the gender of managers 
                                                          
5
Alhazaimeh, Palaniappan, and Almsafir (2014) show that firms try to communicate to their 
investors that they have good investment opportunities by highlighting the future prospects of the firm 
through voluntary information disclosure.     
 
6
The existing literature examines impacts of CFO gender on voluntary disclosure but focuses on 
firm voluntary disclosures in the annual reports. For example, Nalikka (2009) finds that firms with female 
CFOs are synonymous with greater voluntary disclosures in annual reports. My paper focuses on CFOs 
impacts on bad news disclosure.  
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
 4 
 
affects early disclosure of bad news to the stock market. While Kothari et al. (2009) find that 
managers, on average delay bad news announcement, I find that when a firm has a female CFO 
as part of its management team, the firm is more likely to release bad news on time. These results 
suggest that treating managers as a homogeneous unit may not give a true reflection of how firms 
disclose information, either good or bad news to investors.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the next section, section 2 reviews the 
existing literature and presents the hypothesis. Issues like the Chief Financial Officer, gender 
based literature and information disclosure, CFOs and information disclosure, dividend change 
and information relevance, factors affecting firms‟ dividend payment policy and factors 
influencing bad or good news disclosure are covered. The sections 3 and 4 present the 
methodology and the results respectively. The last section, section five, presents the conclusion, 
suggestions and limitations.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
2.1.1 The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
  The CFO is a company officer whose basic responsibility is managing the financial 
system of a firm. A firm‟s financial system comprises several parts. This includes financial 
reporting, tax, treasury and cost management, budgeting, fund raising and financial strategy 
(Mian, 2001). In large organisations, these components are usually divided between the financial 
controller and the treasurer who directly report to the Chief Financial Officer. However, in 
smaller firms, these roles are usually performed by the CFO.  
With regards to financial reporting, the CFO presides over the preparation and 
presentation of the financial statements in accordance with relevant financial reporting standards 
(for example GAAP, IFRS). In addition to presiding over the financial reports preparation, the 
CFO also serves in most firms as the external communication officer in matters relating to 
financial strategy of the firm. For example, in most US firms, the CFO represents the firm in 
conference calls with analysts (Mian, 2001). According to Mian (2001), on the part of the 
treasury business of the firm, the CFO is responsible for raising funds on the stock market for the 
firm. In some firms too, the CFO may also serve as an advisor on the development and execution 
of corporate strategy (Mian, 2001). In summary, the CFO is responsible for the financial systems 
of the firm.  
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2.1.2 Gender Based Literature and Information Disclosure  
Following the recent increase in the number of females in top management positions (see 
Mohan (2004), Catalyst (2007), Peterson and Philpot (2007), Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011)) 
academia has opened up investigations into how the presence of females, both on boards and in 
managerial positions impact the activities of companies. The surge in the literature on directors‟ 
gender or gender diversity is based on the premise that both men and women behave differently 
in managing and risk taking (Burke (1994), Powell and Ansic (1997), Kastlunger, Dressler, 
Kirchler, Mittone, and Voracek (2010), Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011), Francis et al. (2014)). The 
findings in these literatures generally demonstrate that women have significant influence on firm 
decision making as new ideas and distinctive approach to handling diverse organisational 
activities are brought together; neutralising the traditional masculine way of handling business 
activities and decisions. Burke (1994) acknowledges the fact that female board members make 
distinctive and positive contributions towards firm decision making.  
 Gender diverse board literature
7
 generally reveals that the high number of female board 
members in recent years has brought significant dynamics to the board behavour, decision 
making, meetings, monitoring, and many other functions of the board. A typical of such 
literature is Larkin et al. (2013) which show that higher number of female representations in 
managerial positions and on boards is linked to a higher sense of responsible corporate behaviour 
and reduce the level of “group think”. Some authors find that gender balanced board is known 
for quality board room communications and discussions on sensitive corporate issues and these 
sensitive issues are normally not in favour of male dominated boards (Stephenson (2004), 
Broadbridge et al. (2006)). These effective board room communications and discussions usually 
translate into effective information disclosure to the investors. Gul et al. (2011) noted that well-
balanced gender board increases the informativeness of stock price via improved public 
disclosure. Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007), Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that 
company boards with well-balanced female representations are good monitors and that female 
directors provide good counsel and ensure good managerial accountability thus ensuring high 
quality public disclosure. Chen et al. (2015) also find that companies with well-balanced board 
attain higher success in innovations.  
                                                          
7
 See (Broadbridge, Hearn, Huse, and Grethe Solberg (2006), Chen, Leung, and Evans (2015)) for 
further reading. 
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 The sociology and psychological literature on gender generally show that females are risk 
averse. For example, Arch (1993), Eckel and Grossman (2002), Kastlunger et al. (2010) in one 
way or the other attested to the fact that females are risk averse. Eckel and Grossman (2002) in 
their experimental studies present to their subjects gambles differing in normal return and 
variance and based on two distinctive frames. As part of the process, subjects in one instance 
were paid a fixed sum for finishing the survey and thereafter subjected to risk. The subjects were 
rewarded based on their choices and the results from the gamble. They experimented for sex 
differences in the subjects‟ choices and found that females were risk averse than males. 
Additionally, Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) in their study of gender differences in risk 
taking: a meta-analysis, investigate the risk-taking propensities of men and women. They 
postulate that out of 16 tasks, 14 show that males are more risk takers. Arch (1993) also provide 
empirical evidence that women are more risk averse than men. He noted that while men are more 
likely to see risky situations as challenges, women see them as threats and must be avoided. 
Another study also finds that single women exhibit comparatively more risk aversion in financial 
decision making than single men (Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998). All these studies, in one way 
or the other, suggest that women are more risk averse than men. The primary interest of this 
study is in the extent to which these patterns of behaviour extend into firms information 
disclosure and financial decision-making. Perhaps, these patterns of behaviour or risk aversion 
nature might be the underlining reasons why women are described as being more socially 
oriented, more selfless, less competitive, more compliant with rules, stimulating quality financial 
reporting etc.
8
 
 Another stream of literature, the accounting literature, documents that female executives 
are conservative and risk averse and thus serve their companies better in several ways. Some of 
these researches show that female managers are synonymous with lower earnings management 
(Barua et al., 2010), pursue higher conservative accounting policies (Francis et al., 2014), and 
follow rules and regulations more diligently (Brinig, 1995). The interest of this research is to 
examine how the gender of the CFO, particularly the female CFO influences firm timely 
disclosure of bad business performance than firms without female CFO. 
                                                          
8
 Other recent studies linking women to risk aversion include: Venkatesh, Morris, and Ackerman, 
2000; Kleinjans, 2009; Kastlunger et al., 2010; Abbott, Parker, & Presley, 2012 
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2.1.3 CFOs and Information Disclosure 
Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the role of the CFO 
with respect to financial reporting and disclosure has been stringent. The section 302 of the Act 
enjoins the CEO and CFO to ensure the accuracy, documentation, certification, and submission 
of corporate annual or quarterly financial reports together with internal control mechanisms to 
the Security and Exchange Commission. Focusing on the CFO; he/she has virtually full control 
over the financial reporting activities of the firm and thus he/she is more likely to have 
significant influence over what, how and when to report a financial decision, see (Mian (2001); 
Geiger and North (2006)). Despite numerous papers investigate the role of the CFO before and 
after the passage of the XOS; it is intriguing that little, if not none, can be learnt about the role of 
the CFO gender on financial statements quality and early bad news or bad business performance 
disclosure. Famous existing papers in this regards are Kasznik and Lev (1995), “To warn or not 
to warn: Management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise”, and Kothari et al. (2009), 
“Do managers withhold bad news?”. Even though the findings in these papers are economically 
important, they all treat managers as a homogeneous unit. The closest paper for that matter is 
Nalikka (2009) who finds that firms with female CFOs are synonymous with greater voluntary 
disclosures in annual reports. Even though the results are interesting and important, the paper 
suffers some limitations thus making generalisation of the results quite complicated. The sample 
period is relatively small covering 2005, 2006 and 2007. It is also focused on corporate annual 
reports and typically based on listed companies on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, Finland. It is 
therefore worth examining the CFO gender effects on bad news disclosure. The focus is however 
on dividend cut (bad news) disclosure and the market reaction to such news.  
2.1.4 CFOs and Accounting Improprieties 
Recent studies show that despite the strict requirements of SOX, some CFOs have been 
implicated in accounting irregularities. The general argument in these papers is that despite the 
CFO has been charged with significant responsibilities under SOX (ensure accuracy, 
documentation, certification, and submission of corporate annual or quarterly financial 
statements), the CFO does not act independently. He/she is a subordinate to the CEO. Being 
subordinate to the CEO means that the CFO‟s decisions are not independent of the CEO and this 
may significantly affect the decisions made by the CFO; including early financial disclosure. 
Consequently, Ge et al. (2011) document that whether the CFO is independent of the CEO 
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hinges on how much discretion he/she (CFO) exercises over the firm‟s financial reporting. It is 
therefore not surprising that some CFOs are involved in accounting irregularities regardless of 
the cost that comes with it. For instance, Feng et al. (2011) find that CFOs are involved in 
accounting improprieties because they are heavily influenced by the CEOs (see also Francis et al., 
2014).  
2.1.5 Dividend Change and Information Relevance 
How relevant is a change in dividend to the investing community, particularly 
stockholders? This question has been well explored by the existing literature on dividend 
payment policy of firms. Theories around dividend policies (increase, decrease or maintain) 
suggests a change in dividend has substantial information relevance about the performance of the 
firm (Miller and Modigliani (1961), Miller and Rock (1985), Ofer and Siegel (1987), Benartzi, 
Michaely, and Thaler (1997)). According to these literatures a change in dividend has two 
significant information effects: (1) it provides information about the current business 
performance or earnings of the firm (Miller & Rock, 1985), this is realised through the sources 
and uses of a firm‟s financial resource, and (2) it provides information about the ability of the 
firm to generate future cash flows (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). Based on information 
asymmetry principles, Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985) document that a change in 
dividend is not just a mere act of managers to give information about the current state of the firm, 
but also a means by which managers deliberately give information about the future prospects of 
the firm. These studies are consistent with the argument that dividend change provides 
significant information about the future profitability of the firm.  
When dividends are adjusted upward or initiated, the stock market reacts in like manner. 
That is, when dividends are increased, the prices of the stocks go up and similarly, when 
dividends are cut the stock prices fall. This suggests that the stock market (investors) treats 
announcement of changes in dividend as newsworthy (Benartzi et al., 1997).   
Among the earliest literature that provides empirical evidence on the relationship 
between a firm‟s future earnings and its present dividend change is Watts (1973). Watts studies 
the correlation between current dividends and future profitability for 310 firms from 1946 to 
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1967 and finds a positive association between a firm‟s current dividend and its future earnings.9 
Similarly, Gonedes (1978) finds that the impetus for the argument that dividend change has 
information relevance is that a change in dividend echoes the information at the disposal of 
managers and that a change in dividend represents information beyond what is already existing. 
In this light, one would expect a relationship between a firm‟s dividends value and the stock 
market assess of predictive distributions of returns on a firm‟s stock.         
  Since a firm‟s dividend payment policy serves as a source of information disclosure 
about the firm‟s present and future profitability, it is easy to assume that managers have 
significant control over what should be included in the financial reports at any point in time. 
Therefore, this paper seeks to examine how the CFO gender influences early disclosure of bad 
news or bad business performance to the stock market using dividend cuts as proxy for bad news.  
2.1.6 Factors Influencing Firms’ Dividend Policy  
 The existing literature documents a number of factors that affect managers‟ decision 
regarding dividends payment. Prominent among these literature is Baker, Veit, and Powell 
(2001). Baker et al. (2001) with the primary objective of identifying the key factors that dictate 
the dividend policy of US firms that trade on NASDAQ developed questionnaire based on 
twenty-two factors they consider likely to affect these firms‟ dividend policy. The respondents in 
the survey were managers of firms that trade on NASDAQ. Their primary findings indicate that 
out of the twenty-two factors, the most important factor ranked by the respondents is the pattern 
of previous dividends.
10
 The major concern for managers to be reluctant in increasing dividend 
lies in the fact that they are worried about the ability of the firm to maintain the increase in 
dividend in the near future. The consequence of this action of managers has resulted in what is 
termed in the literature as “sticky dividend”. According to Baker et al. (2001), since managers 
                                                          
9
 However, Benartzi et al. (1997) find an interesting result that there is a strong relationship 
between changes in dividends and firms earnings. That is, if dividends go up, the stock prices go up. 
However, they were unable to find strong positive evidence that there exists a relationship between 
dividend change and firms future profitability (earnings). They find that two years immediately following 
increase in dividends, changes in firms‟ earnings are significantly uncorrelated with the sign and degree 
of variations in dividends. The possible reason is that increases in dividends usually signal a persistent 
drift in earnings, but not necessarily a signal about the firms‟ future profitability. See also (Lintner, 1956).         
10
 While Dobson, Tawarangkoon, and Dufrene (1996) find that the stock market does not price 
dividend consistency, Baker et al. (2001) however  find that firm managers do price dividend consistency.    
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